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Abstract The 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe recognises local government as the
lowest tier of government in a three tier arrangement. Thus, local government,
composed by urban and rural local authorities, now owes its existence directly to the
Constitution and not to legislation as was the case under the previous constitutional
order. The Constitution assigns to local authorities the responsibility to ‘manage’
and ‘represent’ the affairs of people in their respective areas. Every local authority is
given the ‘right to govern’ its jurisdiction with ‘all’ the necessary powers to do so,
including devolved powers. Thus, the Constitution recognises that, for the benefits
associated with decentralisation to be realised, local authorities require a certain
measure of local autonomy. The autonomy which this Constitution affords to local
government is however unknown and unexplored, especially from a constitutional
law point of view. In this article, we measure the degree of local autonomy guar-
anteed by the 2013 Constitution.
Keywords Local government  Local autonomy  Constitution of Zimbabwe 
Decentralisation  Devolution  Zimbabwe
1 Introduction
The role of local government is often underrated even though it is the level of
government that often has the most significant contact with citizens. In many
countries, local governments are responsible for the delivery of basic services such
as water and electricity supply, refuse removal, sanitation and the regulation of land
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use. The role of local government sometimes extends to a wider range of services
and may even include social functions such as education and health.1 While the
responsibilities of local governments vary from country to country, there is no doubt
that their functions critically impact the wellbeing of citizens. Over the past three
decades, various international instruments and guidelines have acknowledged this
important role of local government as well as the institutional design that is
considered to be conducive for that role.2 These instruments and guidelines
particularly emphasise the need to guarantee local government a certain minimum
level of autonomy in order to maximise the potential to realise the benefits usually
associated with decentralisation such as improved service delivery and deepened
democracy.3
Zimbabwe, like many other developing countries, seeks to use decentralisation to
facilitate development, democracy and national unity. The new Constitution4
adopted in 2013 recognises the role of local government in a three tier system of
government. It seems to grant a certain level of autonomy to local authorities. In
general terms, the Constitution requires devolution of power, responsibilities and
resources to the local level.5 More explicitly, it guarantees the ‘right to govern’ of
every local authority with ‘all’ the powers necessary to do so.6 The precise contours
and limits to this local autonomy implied by the Constitution is however unknown
and largely unexplored. In this article, we measure the degree of local autonomy
afforded by the 2013 Constitution. The article is premised on the well-established
notion that local governments play a key role in facilitating development, deepening
democracy and preserving national unity and that a certain degree of local
autonomy is necessary to facilitate that role.7
The first part of the article suggests a method for measuring local autonomy
which is largely informed by international literature on decentralisation. This is
followed by a brief discussion of the history of local government in Zimbabwe and a
discussion of what the 2013 Constitution provides on local government. The article
then proceeds to evaluate the degree of local autonomy in the Constitution and
suggest legislative reforms where relevant. The objective is to contribute towards
the process of constitutional implementation with a particular focus on local
government. Finally, concluding remarks are then given.
1 For instance, the local government systems of Zimbabwe, South Africa and Uganda.
2 See the Africa Charter on the Values and Principles of Decentralisation, Local Governance and Local
Development (adopted by the twenty-third ordinary session of the Assembly, held in Malabo, Equatorial
Guinea, 27 June 2014); United Nations Human Settlement Programme (UN-Habitat) International
guidelines on decentralisation and the strengthening of local authorities, UN-Habitat 2007, Nairobi;
Council of Europe European Charter of Local Self-Government, Strasbourg, 15.X.1985; Commonwealth
Local Government Forum, Time for local democracy, the Aberdeen Agenda: Commonwealth principles
on good practice for local democracy and good governance, London, April 2005.
3 See World Bank (1999), pp. 107–108; Erk (2014), pp. 536–537; Chigwata (2015), pp. 442–443.
4 Constitution of Zimbabwe, Amendment No. 20 of 2013.
5 See Preamble of Chapter 14, Section 264(1) Constitution.
6 See Section 276(1) Constitution.
7 See Panara (2013), p. 372.
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2 Defining and Measuring Local Autonomy
Local autonomy can generally be defined as the extent to which local governments
have discretion in carrying out their duties and obligations. It does not connote
freedom on the part of local authorities to take whatever decisions they want.
Rather, it refers to a certain measure of discretion to make laws, adopt policies and
take decisions within a framework of national or regional laws and subject to
national and/or regional supervision.8 While there is no universally accepted list of
features that constitute local autonomy, some basic features can be identified across
the literature and international instruments on decentralisation.9
Firstly, local autonomy is reflected by the extent to which the existence of local
units is guaranteed. Secondly, it is important to consider the functional areas
allocated to local units and the discretion they have when exercising powers in those
functional areas. Thirdly, local democracy is a basic feature of local autonomy. The
fourth dimension relates to the revenue local units have access to and the discretion
they have in spending them. Fifthly, local autonomy can be measured by assessing
the discretion local units have with respect to their own bureaucracies. The sixth
feature relates to the extent to which other levels of government may interfere in the
exercise of local powers. These six features are discussed in more detail below.
2.1 Security of Existence
It is not uncommon for central governments to, in one way or another, extol the
virtues of decentralisation and commit to protecting local government institutions.
However, history tells us that the intention to decentralise power and resources to
local level is not a sure enough guarantee that local government’s existence is
secure.10 Thus, some measure of protection of the existence of local government is
vital. This is particularly important given that local governments are unlikely to
perform effectively if their existence is put in constant jeopardy by the ability of
higher governments to dis-establish, dismantle, merge or dissolve them at any
time.11 Security of existence can be understood in two ways. First, the existence or
importance of local governments as a tier, level or sphere of government can be
secured or recognised, preferably, in the Constitution. Such constitutional recog-
nition serves as a deterrent against executive or legislative invasion of local powers
by higher government and provides a basis for judicial enforcement of constitutional
limits.12 It is, however, of little relevance in a country where there is no respect for
8 Panara (2013), p. 371.
9 See Africa Charter on the Values and Principles of Decentralisation, Local Governance and Local
Development; UN-Habitat, International guidelines on decentralisation and the strengthening of local
authorities; Council of Europe European Charter of Local Self-Government; Commonwealth Local
Government Forum, Time for local democracy, the Aberdeen Agenda: Commonwealth principles on
good practice for local democracy and good governance; Panara (2013); Tarr (2011); Eaton and
Schroeder (2010); World Bank (1999).
10 Tarr (2011), p. 172.
11 Kalin (1998), p. 1.
12 Tarr (2011), p. 173.
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the constitution and/or where court judgments do not matter. It can also be easily
evaded if there are no stringent procedures of amending the constitutional
provisions protecting local government. Secondly, the existence of each individual
local government unit, together with its legal status and political appearance can be
secured. While constitutional protection of each local government unit is neither
feasible nor practical, a constitution can include measures to guard against arbitrary
disestablishment or amalgamation of local authorities.
In some countries on the African continent, the constitution not only guarantees
local government as a level of government but also extends protection to each local
government unit individually. For example, section 3(6) of the Constitution of
Nigeria (1999) provides that there ‘shall’ be 768 Local Government Areas and six
area councils in Nigeria. These local government areas and area councils are then
listed by name in the First Schedule of the Constitution of Nigeria. This secures the
existence of each local government unit. The disadvantage is that it is creates
inflexible local boundaries. In practice, local government boundaries may need to be
adjusted to changes in population, settlement and movements of people. Some
constitutions therefore opt to recognise substantive and/or procedural criteria for
changing local government boundaries. Such mechanisms, especially if coupled
with the role of an independent body, have proved effective in providing security of
existence to each local unit in countries such as South Africa.13
2.2 Democracy
Local democracy lies at the heart of decentralisation. In the context of local
government, it means that voters are allowed to elect local representatives under a
legal and institutional environment that guarantees regular, free and fair elections.
Local autonomy loses meaning when local leaders are appointed by higher
authorities. Local democracy also refers to citizens participating in decisions that
affect them. The extent to which a constitution recognises this dimension to local
democracy is important. Constitutional recognition of the values of participatory
democracy and the establishment of participatory structures and mechanisms can go
a long way in promoting a culture of participatory democracy. Accessibility and
public disclosure of budgeting, procurement, and expenditure decisions and
processes are a fundamental element of this.14
2.3 Powers
The constitutional protection of local powers provides the assurance that decen-
tralised powers will not be recentralised arbitrarily. Further, if local governments are
to play a meaningful role in facilitating development, their powers ought to be
relevant to that.15 Therefore, it is important to asses not only whether or not powers
13 See Fessha and de Visser (2015), pp. 87, 90–92.
14 Ford (1999), p. 14.
15 World Bank (1999), p. 109. The assignment of functions to subnational governments can be based on
considerations such as economies of scales, cost–benefit spill overs and proximity to beneficiaries.
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are guaranteed but also whether the powers are relevant. The principle of
subsidiarity may serve as a useful benchmark to determine whether local
governments are empowered to take charge of those functions that are capable of
devolution. Furthermore, it is important that local powers are clearly demarcated to
reduce overlap in responsibilities, cost-evasion, loss of accountability and unfunded
mandates.16 In addition to being relevant and clearly demarcated, it is important to
assess the extent to which the allocation of power involves discretion or final
decision making authority.17 Panara argues that ‘the existence of an autonomous
sphere of responsibility is one of the essential elements of local [autonomy].18
Circumstances (size, demographics, the local economy etc.) in local authorities
differ. The same applies to their capabilities to deliver and finance public services.
The model of decentralisation must thus be sensitive to such differences.19 A degree
of asymmetry with respect to institutions and powers may be achieved, for example
by recognising categories of local governments.20
2.4 Revenue
There is no doubt that the extent to which local governments have access to revenue
determines, to a large degree, their success. The question as to whether local
governments are empowered by law to raise their own revenue is a critical factor in
assessing a multi-level government design. The principle that ‘finance follows
function’21 implies that local governments should have access to the finances
commensurate to their responsibilities. Local taxing powers are likely to be of little
relevance for revenue mobilisation and fiscal autonomy, if they are not accompanied
by the right to set tax rates. The degree to which local governments control their
own budgets and expenditure is a further determinant of local autonomy.22 While
national governments may require a degree of oversight over local budgets to
safeguard national interests, the power to reject a local budget diminishes fiscal
autonomy of local decision makers.23 Hence, the recognition of local taxing powers
and budget autonomy in the constitution is an important indicator of local
autonomy. The design of the fiscal intergovernmental system to complement local
resource-raising efforts is also important given the disparities that often characterise
most jurisdictions.
16 Word Bank (1999), p. 124.
17 Kalin (1998), p. 2; Bahl (1999), p. 5.
18 Panara (2013), p. 379.
19 Ford (1999), p. 14.
20 Bahl (1999), p. 10.
21 Bahl (1999), p. 7, World Bank (1999), p. 124.
22 Budget autonomy also means that subnational governments do not carry out delegated responsibilities
without commensurate resources—see Eaton and Schroeder (2010), p. 180; Panara (2013), p. 376.
23 Eaton and Schroeder (2010), p. 180.
Local Government in the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe… 169
123
2.5 Administration
Another important aspect of local autonomy is whether or not local governments
have control over personnel and internal administrative processes. The authority
over personnel, i.e. the ability to hire, fire and discipline staff frees local
governments from reliance on higher levels of government and their bureaucracies
to implement local policy decisions.24 If local governments are made dependent on
centrally appointed staff, local bureaucrats may feel more accountable to central
government than to the local leadership. Such authority should be accompanied by
authority to determine as far as possible their own internal administrative structures,
to adapt them to local needs and to ensure effective management.25 Guaranteeing
this in the constitution is an important measure of the extent to which local
governments can devise and administer policies within their respective jurisdic-
tions.26 There is a downside, however. Administrative autonomy increases the risk
of elite capture at local level.27 It also increases the risk of inequitable distribution
of skilled and qualified human resources between urban and rural jurisdictions.
Mechanisms to address the downside of administrative autonomy are thus required,
as explained in detail below.
2.6 Extent of Supervisory Powers
To empower national government to supervise local governments is as important as
granting local governments autonomy.28 National supervision is necessary to
address the challenges usually associated with decentralisation such as elite capture,
capacity problems, regional inequality and threats to macro-economic instability.29
Supervision is understood here to refer to the power to regulate, monitor, support,
and intervene in local affairs. With respect to regulation, the national government
should be able to determine a national legal framework within which local
governments must operate. It should also be legally permitted to monitor the
performance of local governments as well as its compliance with the law.
Regularised audits as well as obliging local governments to report regularly and
openly on their financial status may serve to improve local governance.
When monitoring reveal challenges that hinder the ability of a local authority to
perform its functions, it may be necessary for the national government to support
that local authority. As a measure of last resort, national government should be able
to intervene in a local authority that behaves illegally by assuming (parts of) its
authority. This is the most intrusive form of supervision and whether or not it can
co-exist with a system of decentralised government can only be assessed with
reference to the checks and balances that surround this instrument. The arbitrary
24 Fessha and Kirkby (2008), p. 259.
25 UN-Habitat (2009), p. 12.
26 See Erk (2014), p. 439.
27 Fessha and Kirkby (2008), p. 251.
28 Panara (2013), p. 376.
29 See Erk (2014), pp. 11–13; Chigwata (2015), p. 443.
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removal of locally elected officials or take-over of local functions will undermine
the decentralised system of government. It is therefore important to assess whether
there are procedural and substantive criteria for intervention and whether the
intervention can be reviewed by an independent institution. Furthermore, the extent
to which the rules for intervention are constitutionalised speaks volumes about the
protection of local autonomy and the role of national government.30
By way of context to the assessment of local government in Zimbabwe in terms
of the above indicators, a brief history of local government in Zimbabwe follows
below.
3 History of Local Government in Zimbabwe
Local government has been a feature of governance in Zimbabwe since the colonial
times. Before then, the institution of traditional leadership comprising kings, chiefs,
headmen and village heads, was the only governance structure.31 During the
colonial era, local government was racially organised. Urban councils were
responsible for managing urban areas inhabited mostly by whites and rural councils
administered only those parts of rural areas which were occupied also by whites.
Other local institutions—advisory and town boards—were established to manage
urban areas inhabited by blacks. The successive colonial governments exercised
indirect rule over communal rural areas, where the majority of blacks resided,
through the institution traditional leadership and native (African) councils.32 The
urban and rural councils were well-resourced and had more powers that the local
government structures established for blacks. This status quo largely remained intact
until 1979 when the independence settlement was reached at Lancaster House
between the liberation movements and the Rhodesian and British governments. The
negotiated Lancaster House Constitution, which became the supreme law of
independent Zimbabwe, did not recognise local government. It only recognised the
role of traditional leaders. Local government was a creature of national legislation.
This meant that its existence and form was determined by the national
government.33 Classified into urban and rural local authorities, local government
could only exercise those powers granted by ordinary legislation. The primary
pieces of legislation are the Urban Councils Act34 and Rural District Councils Act.35
The Urban Councils Act and Rural District Councils Act assigned a range of
responsibilities and powers to urban and rural councils, respectively. These
responsibilities ranged from basic municipal services to welfare services, among
others. Taxing powers were also decentralised to these local governments to enable
them to fund the delivery of these services as well as meet other development
30 UN-Habitat (2009), p. 10.
31 Chigwata (2015), p. 445.
32 Chigwata (2015), p. 446–448.
33 See Mushamba et al. (2014), p. 5.
34 Chapter 29: 15 of 1996.
35 Chapter 29: 13 of 1988.
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priorities. The most prominent feature of both the Urban Councils Act and the Rural
District Councils Act was that they both provided for a comprehensive scheme of
supervision by the national government. The national minister responsible for local
government was equipped with a wide array of powers that not only allowed him to
set policy parameters but also to get involved in the day-to-day activities of local
authorities. For instance, the Minister had the power to approve by-laws, budgets
and plans before they could become operational or binding.36 The Minister could
even rescind or alter decisions of the council.37 The exercise of national supervision
has been quite controversial during the Lancaster House constitutional order,
particularly since the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), an opposition
party, emerged on the scene in the early 2000s. Since then, the MDC has controlled
most urban areas, including the biggest cities of Harare and Bulawayo, while the
Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) has maintained
control of the national government. The central-local relations have been
acrimonious ever since. Allegations of the Minister using his supervisory powers
over local government for political gain are widely documented.38 Local autonomy
was compromised in many ways. Some scholars trace the underperformance of local
authorities to this excessive supervisory role of the Minister both in law and
practice.39
Under the Lancaster House constitutional order there was very little, if any, that
prevented the central government from recentralising decentralised powers and
responsibilities. Since independence, the national government has indeed recen-
tralised a number of local responsibilities. For instance, the distribution of
electricity, which used to be undertaken by selected urban local governments, was
recentralised soon after independence. In 2005, the central government recentralised
the water and sanitation functions and assigned them to a newly created parastatal,
Zimbabwe National Water Authority. This was a failure, however, and the water
and sanitation functions were restored to local government.40 In any event, the
system of local government was premised on strict central control and very little, if
any, autonomy for local authorities. During the process towards the adoption of the
2013, it became apparent that there was a desire to shield local government from
politically motivated interventions.41 The 2013 Constitution therefore grants local
authorities a certain degree of local autonomy. The remainder of this article focuses
on how strong this autonomy is.
36 See Section 229(2), 219(1) Urban Councils Act and Section 90(4), 17(1) Rural District Councils Act.
37 See Section 314 Urban Councils Act and Section 52(3) Rural District Councils Act.
38 See Kamete (2006).
39 See Chakunda (2015), p. 4; Mushamba et al. (2014), p. 5, 10; Chigwata (2017), p. 222.
40 Mushamba (2010), p. 109.
41 Muchadenyika (2015), p. 111.
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4 The Constitutional Basis of Local Government in Zimbabwe
The 2013 Constitution organises government at the national, provincial and local
levels. Provincial and metropolitan councils make up the provincial tier while the
local tier of government is constituted by urban and rural local authorities.42 Urban
local authorities are established to manage and represent the affairs of people living
in urban areas, whereas rural local authorities govern rural areas. The Constitution
permits the establishment of different classes of urban and rural local authorities.
This system is designed to result in asymmetric decentralisation.43 This constitu-
tional provision is an acknowledgement of the differences between rural and urban
areas and the local authorities there.
Contrary to the previous constitutional dispensation, the 2013 Constitution
envisages local authorities exercising devolved powers and not only delegated
powers. The principle of devolution is one of the Founding Values and Principles of
the Constitution.44 It is further anchored by the Preamble of Chapter 14 which reads:
Whereas it is desirable to ensure: (a) the preservation of national unity in
Zimbabwe and the prevention of all forms of disunity and secessionism;
(b) the democratic participation in government by all citizens and commu-
nities of Zimbabwe; and (c) the equitable allocation of national resources and
the participation of local communities in the determination of development
priorities within their areas; there must be devolution of power and
responsibilities to lower tiers of government in Zimbabwe.
The Preamble itself contains a constitutional instruction to the national
government to devolve power to lower level governments in order to realise
certain goals. Section 264(1) of the Constitution further gives effect to the Preamble
by stating that ‘whenever appropriate’, the national government must devolve
powers and responsibilities to local authorities ‘which are competent’ to carry out
those responsibilities ‘efficiently and effectively’.45 The obvious challenge with this
provision is how to determine when it is ‘appropriate’ to devolve power or when a
local authority is ‘competent’ to carry responsibilities efficiently and effectively.
Given that the Constitution does not specify who decides when it is ‘appropriate’, it
stands to reason that the national government will make that decision.
The Constitution lists six objectives of devolution:
(a) to give powers of local governance to the people and enhance their
participation in the exercise of the powers of the State and in making decision
affecting them;
(b) to promote democratic, effective, transparent, accountable and coherent
government in Zimbabwe as a whole;
42 Section 5 Constitution.
43 See Section 274(3), 275(3) Constitution.
44 Section 3(2)(l) Constitution.
45 Section 264(1) Constitution.
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(c) to preserve and foster the peace, national unity and indivisibility of
Zimbabwe;
(d) to recognise the right of communities to manage their own affairs and to
further their own development;
(e) to ensure the equitable sharing of local and national resources; and
(f) to transfer responsibilities and resources from the national government in
order to establish a sound financial base for each provincial and metropolitan
council and local authority.46
The objective to ‘recognise the right of communities to manage their own affairs
and to further their development’ is particularly important. It envisages further
devolution of powers and responsibilities to local authorities.47 The objectives of
devolution are supported by a set of general principles which are designed to
regulate the conduct of local authorities. Local authorities are required to:
(a) ensure good governance by being effective, transparent, accountable and
institutionally coherent;
(b) assume only those functions conferred on them by th[e] Constitution or an
Act of Parliament;
(c) exercise their functions in a manner that does not encroach on the
geographical, functional or institutional integrity of another tier of
government;
(d) cooperate with one another, in particular by (i) informing one another or, and
consulting one another on, matters of common interest (ii) harmonising and
coordinating their activities;
(e) preserve the peace, national unity and indivisibility of Zimbabwe;
(f) ensure the fair and equitable representation of people within their areas of
jurisdiction.48
These principles regulate both the ways in which local authorities carry out their
activities as well as the outcome of those activities. For instance, the duty to ensure
good governance is an outcome while that of cooperating with one another is a
means to an end—the end being effective multilevel governance. However, the
principles are of little use to realise the intended outcome unless relevant laws and
policies are enacted to give effect to them.
The requirement for and objectives of devolution as well as the principles of local
government discussed above point to a minimum level of autonomy that local
authorities must enjoy. Local authorities are yet to enjoy such autonomy partially
because the legislation, which governs and impacts on local government, has not
been reformed.
46 Sction 264(2) Constitution.
47 Mushamba et al. (2014), p. 5.
48 Section 265(2) Constitution.
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5 Measuring the Degree of Local Autonomy in the 2013 Constitution
The following assessment of the autonomy for local government in the 2013
Constitution is carried out on the basis of the indicators that were discussed in
paragraph 2 above. It is argued that while the Constitution has identified local
government as one of the key actors in development and democracy it contains few
guarantees for local autonomy.
5.1 Establishment and Disestablishment of Local Government
The 2013 Constitution provides some recognition for local government by entrenching it
as the lowest tier of government.49 At a minimum, this means that the national government
may not modify the general status of local government as a tier of government without
amending the Constitution.50 However, there is no constitutional protection for individual
local authorities.51 The Constitution does not deal with the process or criteria for the
establishment or disestablishment of local authorities and leaves this to Parliament to
regulate. In terms of the current Urban Councils Act and Rural District Councils Act, the
national government has wide powers to establish, abolish, merge or alter boundaries of a
local authority(s) at any time.52 The affected local authority and its communities are
consulted in the process of abolition, merger and establishment of local authorities but it is
the national executive that makes the final decision.53 Furthermore, there is little, if any,
scrutiny by Parliament or any independent body. It is argued that, with little or no
oversight, there is ample room for these processes to be used for political ends.
5.2 Election and Removal from Office of Local Officials
With respect to the democratic status of local politicians, the 2013 Constitution
deepens local democracy and thus supports an important aspect of local autonomy.
This is borne out, firstly, by the objectives of devolution which include the
promotion of democratic government in Zimbabwe.54 This means that governance
structures and procedures should uphold and promote both representative and
participatory democracy. Secondly, the constitutional guarantees for the election of
local officials are important in this respect.
5.2.1 Election of Local Officials
The 2013 Constitution requires ‘all’ councillors of each local authority to be directly
elected by registered voters within its area of jurisdiction.55 This is a departure from
49 Section 5 Constitution.
50 Mushamba et al. (2014), p. 6.
51 See Mushamba et al. (2014), p. 5.
52 See section 4, 5, 6 Urban Councils Act and section 6, 8 Rural District Councils Act.
53 See section 9 Rural District Councils Act.
54 Section 264(2)(b) Constitution.
55 Section 265(2) Constitution.
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the previous constitutional order where some councillors were elected while others
where appointed by the national Minister responsible for local government.56 These
appointed officials carried out the same duties and were entitled to the same benefits
as elected councillors, but could not vote in council meetings.57 The appointment of
councillors by the Minister was not only undemocratic but also used to achieve
political goals.58 A study carried out by De Visser and Mapuva in 20 major urban
local authorities showed that out of 57 appointed councillors in these authorities
only 2 were affiliated to the MDC while the rest were aligned to ZANU-PF.59 This
clearly indicates there was tension between the notion of democratically elected
councils and the central appointment of ministerial representatives to councils. By
allowing elected councillors only, the 2013 Constitution thus seeks to break with
this practice and thus deepens local democracy. The result of this new constitutional
provision is that the current section 4A of the Urban Councils Act and section 11 of
the Rural District Councils Act, both of which provide for the combination of
elected and appointed councillors, are unconstitutional.60
5.2.2 Removal from Office of Local Officials
Under the previous constitutional order, the President could suspend and dismiss
any councillor in a rural local authority from exercising all or any of their functions
if he or she considered it ‘necessary or desirable to do so in the public interest or in
the interest of the inhabitants of a council area’.61 In urban local authorities, the
Minister could also suspend and dismiss councillors on a number of grounds,
including corruption or misconduct.62 These powers were exercised controversially,
especially in urban local authorities.63 Between 1999 and 2008, the Minister
suspended and/or dismissed a considerable number of councillors and/or councils on
varying allegations of poor performance, ‘shady’ tendering procedures, corruption,
mismanagement and incompetence.64 Most of the councillors or councils that were
suspended and/or dismissed were aligned to the MDC, while the incumbent Minister
was aligned to ZANU-PF.65 Arbitrary though the suspensions and dismissals may
seem to be, the Minister relied on his powers under the Urban Councils Act.66
It is as a result of these challenges that the 2013 Constitution tried to reform the
supervisory mechanism in relation to the suspension and dismissal of locally elected
officials. Under the new constitutional regime, locally elected officials may no
56 See Section 11 Rural District Councils Act and Section 4A Urban Councils Act.
57 Mushamba (2010), p. 103.
58 Sims (2013), p. 17.
59 See De Visser and Mapuva (2013), pp. 170–171.
60 Section 31 of the Rural District Councils Act requires similar alignment.
61 Section 157(1)(2) Rural District Councils Act.
62 Section 114 Urban Councils Act. See also section 107, 108 and 109 Urban Councils Act.
63 Kamete (2006), p. 38.
64 Kamete (2006), p. 36.
65 Chakunda (2015), p. 4.
66 Kamete (2006), p. 38; Chakunda (2015), p 4.
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longer be removed from office arbitrarily. Section 278(1) of the Constitution now
strictly regulates when a councillor vacates office. A councillor vacates office when
he or she resigns, when the council is dissolved or if he or she ceases to be a
qualified as a voter.67 A council, by majority decision, may also declare a council
seat vacant if the incumbent was absent from the council for 21 consecutive days.
The other grounds are: if a councillor accepts public office elsewhere or if he or she
fails to relinquish that office after being elected as a councillor. Finally, the seat
becomes vacant if the councillor is convicted of a crime. The Constitution now
provides an exhaustive list of grounds for vacating office and this provision can be
used as a basis for judicial review.
A councillor may also be removed from office by an independent tribunal
provided for under an Act of Parliament. The grounds for removal are limited. The
first group of grounds relate to inability to perform the functions of a councillor due
to mental or physical incapacity, gross incompetence and gross misconduct.
Furthermore, the tribunal may remove a councillor from office if he or she is
convicted of an offence involving dishonesty, corruption or abuse of office. Wilful
violation of the law, including a by-law, also constitutes a ground for removal.68
The decisions of the tribunal are reviewable by the High Court. It is suggested that
the introduction of an independent body and the listing of specific grounds upon
which locally elected officials may be removed from office provides protection to
locally elected officials that they did not enjoy before. However, much will depend
on how the Tribunal is constituted and whether it will be able to operate
independently. As will be argued below, this is where the Constitution is being
undermined by statutory law.
The Local Government Laws Amendment Act of 2016 was adopted to implement
these constitutional provisions. It makes provision for the establishment of a three
member independent tribunal to be established on an ad hoc basis.69 All the
members of the tribunal, including its chairperson, are appointed by the Minister
responsible for local government. The Law Society of Zimbabwe nominates
individuals for the position of chairperson and the Civil Service Commission does
the same with respect to the two other members of the tribunal. The head of the
Ministry responsible for local government must provide administrative support to
the tribunal.70 Thus, the Ministry responsible for local government plays a
significant role in the establishment and functioning of this tribunal. In a cunning,
but arguably unconstitutional move, the Act brings the Minister back as the prime
overseer of councillors at the expense of the new Tribunal. It does this by stipulating
that the Tribunal is only competent to consider the dismissal of councillors who
have already been suspended by the Minister.71 The Act thus creates a distinction
between suspension and dismissal. The first is the prerogative of the Minister and
the second is the prerogative of the Tribunal. What is more, the Tribunal’s power to
67 Section 129 Constitution.
68 Section 278(2) Constitution.
69 Section 157A Local Government Laws Amendment Act, 2016.
70 See section 2, 3 Local Government Laws Amendment Act, 2016.
71 See section 2(3) Local Government Laws Amendment Act, 2016.
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dismiss is made conditional upon the Minister first having suspended that
councillor. It is argued that this condition makes it impossible for the Tribunal to
exercise its power independently of the Minister. Instead, the Act limits the
Tribunal’s power to a power to ‘consummate’ a suspension that was initiated by the
Minister by turning it into a dismissal. This, it is submitted, goes against the
provisions of the Constitution. While the Constitution offers considerable protection
to locally elected officials, the Local Government Laws Amendment Act
undermines this.
It then also comes as no surprise that controversial suspensions of councillors
continued after the adoption of the 2013 Constitution. Since then a number of
councillors from Gweru, Harare and Bulawayo have been suspended under disputed
circumstances.72 In separate cases, the Gweru and Harare councillors challenged the
constitutionality of their respective (re)suspensions. The Court declared the
(re)suspensions illegal and directed their reinstatement.73 It is argued that the
constitutional and legal framework provides insufficient protection against the
suspensions and dismissals of locally elected officials, orchestrated for political
gain.
5.3 Powers and Responsibilities of Local Authorities
As indicated earlier, the extent and scope of powers for local authorities is an
important indicator of local autonomy. With respect to this, the new Constitution
presents a mixed picture. Section 276(1) of the Constitution states that ‘subject to
th[e] Constitution and any Act of Parliament, a local authority has the right to
govern, on its own initiative, the local affairs of the people within the area for which
it has been established, and has all the powers necessary for it to do so’.74 With this
provision, which closely resembles section 151(4) of the South African Constitu-
tion, the Constitution itself seems to allocate powers directly to local authorities. It
affords a constitutional ‘right’ to each local authority to govern the affairs of its
people. However, this right can be limited not just by the Constitution (as is the case
in the South African equivalent to this section) but also by any Act of Parliament.
This then significantly reduces the constitutional protection offered by this
provision. The Constitution does not list the powers and functions of local
authorities. A system of ‘enumerated powers would provide some degree of
certainty as to what local authorities can and/or shall do’.75 Instead, the Constitution
gives Parliament the discretion to determine local powers and functions through
legislation.76 The implication of the lack of constitutional recognition of the powers
72 See Hamutendi Kombayi and Ors v The Minister of Local Government, Public Works and National
Housing and Ors HB 57116; Manyenyeni v Minister, Local Government, Public Works and National
Housing & Another (HH 385-16 HC 5903/16) [2016] ZWHHC 385 (29 June 2016).
73 See Hamutendi Kombayi and Ors v The Minister of Local Government, Public Works and National
Housing and Ors; Manyenyeni v Minister, Local Government, Public Works and National Housing &
Another.
74 Section 276(1) Constitution.
75 Panara (2013), p. 383.
76 Section 276(2) Constitution.
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and functions of local authorities is that the national government may recentralise
them at any time. As observed above, such recentralisation has been common in
Zimbabwe.
However, it cannot be argued that the 2013 Constitution did not change anything.
Given that it affords every local authority ‘the right to govern’ and ‘all’ the
powers necessary to do so, it requires that local authorities exercise significant
powers and enjoy a certain measure of local autonomy. It is suggested that, at a
minimum, it means that there are limits to the role of national government in local
affairs. Effective protection and promotion of such as ‘right’ requires that the
excessive supervisory powers which were assigned to the Minister under the
Lancaster House Constitution (such as the power to reverse, suspend and alter
council resolutions) be reformed.77 Furthermore, it suggested that it also means that
the national government is under a constitutional obligation to decentralise relevant
and significant powers in line with the principle of subsidiarity.
5.4 Revenue-Raising at Local Level
Local authorities in Zimbabwe generally raise revenue by charging user fees,
imposing taxes or accessing grants from the national government. One of the
objectives of devolution in the Constitution is ‘to transfer responsibilities and
resources from the national government in order to establish a sound financial base
for each provincial and metropolitan council and local authority’.78 The Consti-
tution recognises how important financial resources are for the ability of local
authorities to effectively perform their functions. The question is, however, whether
the Constitution goes further than this general objective. To what extent does it
guarantee local authorities access to revenue?
5.4.1 Taxing Powers
The Constitution does not assign specific powers to raise revenue to local
authorities. However, it does provide a general framework and clearly envisages the
assignment of revenue-raising powers to local authorities so as to establish a sound
financial base for each local authority.79 It provides that an ‘Act of Parliament may
confer functions on local authorities, including the power to levy rates and taxes and
generally to raise sufficient revenue for them to carry out their objects and
responsibilities’.80
The Urban Councils Act, Rural District Councils Act and other sectoral pieces of
legislation assign to local authorities the power impose user-charges, property tax,
levies, licencing fees and the authority to sell or lease land or buildings.81 However,
77 See Mushamba (2010), p 107.
78 Section 264(2)(f) Constitution.
79 See Section 264(2) Constitution.
80 Section 276(2)(b) Constitution.
81 See Section 218, 159, 179, 173, 174, 178, 152, 269, 272; Second Schedule 12, 17; Urban Councils Act
and Section 72, 75, 86, 96, 97, 98 Rural District Councils Act.
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they prohibit a local authority from raising user-charges without the permission of
the Minister.82 Not having the final say over the determination of tax rates means
that local authorities are unable to vary rates in line with local economic
developments to improve revenue mobilisation. Furthermore, despite having
revenue-raising powers, local authorities actually raise very little revenue.83 Two
decades of economic hardship has adversely impacted the ability of citizens and the
business community to pay for services provided. The taxing powers that local
authorities do control are also not the most buoyant: income tax, company taxes, toll
fees and vehicle related taxes are all reserved for national government.84
Sims therefore argues that the failure by the Constitution to guarantee the
financial autonomy of local authorities will perpetuate the marginalisation of local
authorities that have ‘stunted local development since independence’.85 It is
submitted that the constitutional objective to establish a sound financial base for
each local authority must require the decentralisation of taxes to local level.
Revenue sources that are capable of raising significant revenue for local authorities
must be transferred together with a degree of discretion in determining taxation
rates. The exercise of local autonomy must be supervised by the national
government. However, the role of the Minister should be limited to setting a
national framework for each local authority to exercise its powers to determine rates
with respect to relevant and reasonably buoyant taxes and fees. This would go a
long way in ensuring that local authorities become more self-sufficient.86
5.4.2 Intergovernmental grants
In any decentralised system, there will be a mismatch between local expenditure
needs and the revenue generated locally.87 Moreover, each local authority’s tax base
and capacity to actually raise revenue will be different. Intergovernmental grant
funding must thus complement the local revenue-raising effort. Revenue raised
nationally must be shared among governments at various levels. The 2013
Constitution recognises the need for vertical and horizontal sharing of nationally
generated revenue. The vertical division of revenue distributes portions of
nationally generated revenue to the three tiers generally. The horizontal division
determines what each individual local authority receives.
On the vertical division, the Constitution requires the allocation of ‘not less than
five per cent of the national revenues raised in any financial year’ to provincial and
local governments.88 This requirement does not guarantee any individual local
82 Section 219(1) Urban Councils Act and Section 17(1) Rural District Councils Act. The same
requirements apply in respect of services provided specifically to or in connection with any residential
accommodation.
83 Chigwata (2017), p. 226.
84 See Mushamba (2010), p. 111.
85 Sims (2013), pp. 23, 2.
86 See UN-Habitat (2009), pp. 8–9.
87 See Bahl (1999), UN-Habitat (2009), Ford (1999).
88 Section 301(3) Constitution.
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authority any specific amount or percentage but guarantees at least five per cent for
the entire provincial and local sector. Cementing a minimum allocation to the
provincial and local tiers in the Constitution inserts a degree of predictability into
the intergovernmental fiscal system and must result in financial resources being
channelled to provinces and local authorities.89 However, the percentage is too low
to guarantee ten provincial governments and 92 local governments sufficient
resources. Furthermore, the fact that the guarantee applies to both local and
provincial governments combined does not augur well for local government. Local
authorities require significant financial resources as they are expected to deliver
public services. The functions of provincial governments are uncertain at best.
Moreover, these provincial governments are to be constituted by a majority of
officials from the national government and may be overseen by nationally appointed
officials. This gives them greater leverage with national government. Thus, local
authorities may lose out to provinces.
With respect to the horizontal division, the Constitution does not provide a
specific formula to determine what each local authority receives. Section 301(1) of
the Constitution directs Parliament to enact a law providing for conditional and
unconditional grants to provincial and local governments. The allocation of such
grants should be informed by criteria set in the Constitution. These include matters
such as the consideration of national interests, the redistribution of wealth and
economic resources between jurisdictions and disparities.90 The criteria resemble in
many respects the criteria for the sharing of revenue among the three spheres of
government provided in the South African Constitution.91 If they are implemented
well, the intergovernmental fiscal system may be effective in addressing disparities
among subnational jurisdictions. In summary, it is submitted that the national
government must develop, in a transparent and consultative way, an equitable and
predictable formula for both the vertical and horizontal sharing of revenue informed
by the criteria of section 30(1) of the Constitution.
5.4.3 Control Over the Budget and Expenditure
The degree of control, exercised by higher authorities with respect to local budget
decisions, is another important indicator of autonomy. This form of control is
capable of considerably limiting the autonomy of local government. It can be used
by higher tiers of government to by-pass the preferences of local citizens and
impose their own political agenda.92
The 2013 Constitution does not explicitly grant local authorities the power to
adopt their own budgets. However, it does anticipate local authorities exercising a
variety of governmental powers, which can be argued to include budget powers.
Section 276(2)(a) states that legislation may confer functions on local authorities for
the effective administration of their respective jurisdictions. Moreover,
89 See UN-Habitat (2009), p. 9.
90 See Section 301(2) Constitution.
91 See Section 214 Constitution of South Africa, Act No. 108 of 1996.
92 Panara (2013), p. 385.
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section 276(1) which guarantees every local authority the ‘right to govern, on its
own initiative, the local affairs of its people,’ with ‘all’ the necessary powers to do
so, implies a degree of budget autonomy. The words on ‘its own initiative’ suggest
that local authorities are expected to make expenditure decisions within the limits of
the law.93 That said, it will be hard to argue that the Constitution unequivocally
protects the power of each local authority to adopt its own budget.
5.5 Administrative Autonomy at the Local Level
The local government system in Zimbabwe empowers the national government to
exercise direct control over local personnel issues.94 For example, section 132 of the
Urban Councils Act demands the approval of the Local Government Board for the
appointment of the town clerk. This interference has made it difficult for local
authorities to adjust their respective personnel establishment to local or/and
economic needs.95 A degree of constitutional protection for local authorities to
make their staffing decisions would have been welcomed by those who argue that
the national government often abuses these powers. However, the administrative
autonomy of local authorities, i.e. their powers to hire and fire staff is not explicitly
guaranteed in the Constitution. Section 276, discussed above, provides for generic
powers to administer but this is made subject to the Constitution and national
legislation. Section 279 also states that legislation must provide for the procedure to
be followed by councils of local authorities.96 Both provisions suggest that national
government will determine the precise contours of local administrative autonomy in
ordinary legislation. It is submitted, however, that the constitutional entrenchment
of local government and the adoption of the constitutional principle of devolution
must shape the interpretation of section 276 of the Constitution. This provision
guarantees local authorities a certain measure of administrative autonomy given its
importance to effective governance. Arguably, the ‘right to govern’ includes the
power to appoint and fire personnel as well as to determine internal administrative
procedures. Similarly, the term ‘on its own initiative’ assumes that a local authority
should be able to make individual decisions to hire and fire personnel within a
framework determined by the national government. Moreover the Constitution
allocates to local authorities ‘‘all’’ the powers necessary to ‘‘govern’’ whether with
respect to personnel establishment or the determination of internal administrative
procedures.
The City of Harare adopted this interpretation of section 276 when it appointed
James Mushore as its town clerk in 2016. Contrary to section 132 of the Urban
Councils Act, the City did not seek the approval of the Local Government Board. It
argued that it has full authority under the Constitution to make the appointment. The
national government responded by issuing a directive purportedly rescinding the
appointment of Mushore as town clerk. The City and civic groups have since
93 See Panara (2013), p. 391.
94 Mushamba et al. (2014), pp. 10, 15.
95 See World Bank (1999), p. 120.
96 Section 279 Constitution.
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brought a High Court application, petitioning the Court to clarify the powers local
authorities enjoy under the Constitution with regard to appointment of staff. If the
City’s approach is upheld, the provisions of the Urban Councils Act and Rural
District Councils97 providing for interference by the Local Government Board or the
Minister in staffing decisions, will have to be revisited.
In summary, while there is no explicit constitutional protection for local
administrative autonomy, the Constitution contains provisions that suggest that
there are limits to the extent to which national government may interfere in staffing
decisions.
5.6 The Supervision of Local Authorities
Supervision, as argued in paragraph 2.6, is a ‘reflection of the fact that, albeit
endowed with [local] autonomy, a local authority is not a sovereign entity and is
part of the overall state machinery’.98 Thus, the supervision of local government—
through regulation, monitoring, support and intervention—is a necessary component
of the decentralisation regime. The question is whether the 2013 Constitution
provides for the supervision of local authorities. National supervision of local
authorities is necessary in order to combat corruption and minimise the wastage of
resources. The Constitution requires the Parliament to supervise public debt,
finances, and the use of borrowing powers by all government including, local
authorities.99 Parliament also has an obligation to ‘monitor and oversee’ expenditure
by local authorities and to enact legislation to give full effect to its financial
oversight role. The Constitution also establishes the office of the Auditor-General to
audit the accounts, financials systems and financial management of local authorities,
among other duties.100
These two supervisory roles are reasonably clear and constitute critical features
of the decentralisation design. However, the Constitution leaves a gap when it
comes to the executive supervision by the national government. There is nothing in
the Constitution that provides for the supervision of local authorities by the national
or provincial government. This means, therefore, that there are also no explicit
constitutional limits on the use of supervisory powers.101 There is then a risk that
local authorities are not treated equally when it comes to the national executive
supervising local government. This is all the more pertinent in a local government
environment that is politically charged and where the ruling party at national
government level is different from the party that controls key local government
institutions. This has been the case in Zimbabwe since 2000.102
97 These are: section 132, 133, 134, 116, 123, 128, 129, 130 Urban Councils Act; Section 66 Rural
District Councils Act.
98 Panara (2013), p. 383.
99 Section 299(1) Constitution.
100 Section 309(2) Constitution.
101 Sims (2013), p. 13.
102 Mushamba et al. (2014), p. 10; Chigwata (2017), p. 222.
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Current local government legislation equips the national Minister responsible for
local government with virtually unlimited supervisory powers. These powers are
often used excessively, raising concerns among scholars about the abuse of
supervision powers for political ends.103 In fact, the toxic central-local relationship
is often cited as one of the reasons why the local government system is failing to
deliver basic services.104 At the same time, the excessive supervision by the
Minister was almost done in line with the law, which gave the Minister extensive
supervision powers.105
The drafters of the Constitution had the opportunity to clarify central-local
relationships and, in particular, specify the scope of supervision powers. However,
the Constitution leaves this to Parliament to regulate. It can be argued, again, that the
constitutional principle of devolution and the constitutional ‘right to govern’ of local
authorities must be interpreted to limit Parliament‘s discretion in regulating the
supervision of local government. Parliament must strike a balance between the need for
supervision and need for local autonomy. It is submitted that the extensive supervisory
powers of the Minister responsible for local government, which were designed under the
now repealed Lancaster House constitutional order, must be revisited.
6 Conclusion
This article set out to assess the autonomy afforded to local government under the
2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe. It was argued that the Constitution protects locally
elected officials from being suspended or dismissed arbitrarily by the national
government. However, the national legislation that was adopted to give effect to this
protection contains provisions that go against this. Aside from the reasonably clear
provisions that protect local democracy, the Constitution actually does not provide
many hard rules guaranteeing the other basic features of local autonomy. The
Constitution merely provides generic powers and functions of local government, the
detail of which will depend on national legislation. It does not specify revenue
raising powers and also does not limit the supervision of local authorities by the
national executive. However, the intent to devolve power, responsibilities and
resources is a prominent feature of the Constitution. Combined with the sacred
phrase, in section 276 of the Constitution, that local authorities have ‘the right to
govern’ there is scope for the argument that a degree of local autonomy is in fact
protected by the Constitution. Much will depend on how the courts will interpret
section 276 of the Constitution.
At the time of writing, the legislative regime for local government had not yet
been brought in line with the Constitution, barring a few minor changes. The
virtually unrestrained supervisory powers afforded to the national governments
remain in place. This brings into question the commitment towards the establish-
ment of a decentralised system of government under which local authorities enjoy
103 Muchadenyika (2015), p. 125; Mushamba et al. (2014), p. 10.
104 See Chakunda (2015), p. 4.
105 See Mushamba (2010), pp. 113–116; Chakunda (2015), p. 1.
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the degree of local autonomy necessary to reap the benefits associated with
decentralisation.
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